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I. Introduction
In April 2011, Apple, Inc. ("Apple") filed a lawsuit against
Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd. ("Samsung") for alleged
copying of Apple's iPad and iPhone technology and style.' This
was merely the beginning of what would eventually become
extensive multi-national litigation over the two companies' mobile
devices.2 Since then, every major cellular maker has become
f J.D. Candidate 2015, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2014. I would like
to thank my family and friends for their love and support.
I Apple v. Samsung, 888 F. Supp. 2d 976,982 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
2 See Florian Mueller, Apple Seeks $2.5 Billion in Damages From Samsung, Offers
Half A Cent Per Standard-Essential Patent, Foss PATENTS (July 24, 2012, 12:00 PM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/07/apple-seeks-25-billion-in-damages-from.html
("[This current lawsuit is] only one of more than 50 lawsuits across the globe."); Paul
Barrett, Apple's War on Android, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 24, 2012),
available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-29/apple-s-war-on-android
(presenting a history of Apple's legal disputes with Samsung).
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embroiled in disputes' in what has been termed the "smartphone
patent war."4 Apple's and Samsung's own seemingly never-
ending litigation has already resulted in numerous lawsuits around
the globe, with cases typically involving billions of dollars in
alleged damages.' Most notably, one U.S. jury trial resulted in a
payout of over $1 billion to Apple for violations of its patent by
Samsung.' With even more lawsuits pending, it seems likely the
two companies will be mired in litigation for the foreseeable
future.'
Not one to be left out, Samsung filed its own complaint against
Apple in the United States International Trade Commission
("USITC"), alleging that Apple's iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch
devices infringed upon several Samsung patents in violation of
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. §
1337, hereinafter "Section 337").' The USITC concluded Apple
3 Colleen Chien & Mark Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest,
98 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4 (2012).
4 See Michael A. Carrier, A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND
Licensing, 4 (No. 2) CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1 (2012). Although the smartphone
patent war encompasses more companies than just Apple and Samsung, this paper will
focus only on Samsung's dispute with Apple in the USITC. See Chien & Lemley, supra
note 3, at 4.
5 See, e.g., Apple v. Samsung, 888 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (United
States); Apple Wins Key German Patent Case Against Samsung, HIGHBEAM RESEARCH
(Sep. 9, 2011), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IGI-266606004.html
(Germany); Apple v. Samsung Patent Trial Kicks Off in Australia, REUTERS (July 23,
2012, 6:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/us-apple-samsung-
idUSBRE86MO7V20120723 (Australia); South Korean Court Rules Apple and Samsung
Both Owe One Another Damages, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2012, 2:37 PM), http://www.wired.
com/gadgetlab/2012/08/s-korea-court-rules-damages/ (South Korea).
6 Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technolog
y/jury-reaches-decision-in-apple-samsung-patent-trial.html. As of the writing of this
Note, this jury decision is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
See Apple, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
7 See, e.g., Richard Lawler, Apple Adds Samsung's Galaxy S III, Galaxy Note and
Galaxy Note 10.1 to Ongoing Patent Lawsuit, ENGADGET (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.engadget.com/2012/08/3 1/apple-samsung-galaxy-s-iii-galaxy-note-patent-
lawsuit/ (detailing a still pending lawsuit by Apple against Samsung).
8 See In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless
Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet
Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, I (July 5, 2013) (Final) [hereinafter USITC Opinion],
available at http://essentialpatentblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/234/2013/07/337-
TA-794-Commission-Opinion-Public-Version.pdf.
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had violated one of Samsung's telecommunication patents, and
consequently issued an exclusionary order against the infringing
Apple devices (also referred to as an "import ban"), along with a
cease-and-desist order barring Apple from further selling the
infringing devices.9 This order was subsequently overturned by
President Obama's Executive Administration ("Executive Veto"),
determining that the weight of public policy prevented
exclusionary relief from being issued against Samsung's standard-
essential patent ("SEP") license, which is encumbered by a pledge
of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") use.'o The
Executive Veto was the first issued over a USITC ruling since
1987." Going forward, the veto should protect consumers from
the economic consequences of an import ban based on an
infringement of a FRAND-encumbered SEP, and help to curtail
abuse of the patent standards system.12
First, this Note will explore the relevant background law."
Next, this Note will examine the facts and history of this particular
Samsung and Apple dispute. 4 This will be followed by an
analysis of the Executive Veto and the public policy concerns with
the USITC's exclusionary order." Finally, this Note will conclude
that the Executive Administration was correct to veto the USITC's
decision thereby protecting public and consumer interests.
9 Id. at 3.
10 Veto of USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-794 (2013) (letter from Ambassador Michael
B. G. Froman to the Honorable Irving A. Williamson, Aug. 3, 2013) [hereinafter
Executive Veto], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013
%20Letter 1.PDF.
II Brent Kendall, Obama Administration Vetoes Ban on Sale of Some Apple
iPhones, iPads, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 4, 2013, 12:09 PM), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424127887324136204578646192008412934.html.
This 1987 veto, issued under the Reagan administration, also featured Samsung. Rowan
Wilson, FRAND and Policy: Obama Vetoes ITC iPhone and iPad Ban, OSS WATCH
(August 6, 2013), http://osswatchjiscinvolve.org/wp/2013/08/06/frand-and-policy-
obama-vetoes-itc-iphone-and-ipad-ban/.
12 See Florian Mueller, Obama Administration Vetoes ITC Import Ban of Older
iPhones and iPads over Samsung Patent, Foss PATENTS (Aug. 3, 2013, 8:56 PM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/08/obama-administration-vetoes-itc-import.html;
Roger Parloff, Obama Should Overturn an ITC Import Ban on Apple Phones, CNN
MONEY (July 30, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/07/30/obama-
should-overtum-an-itc-import-ban-on-apple-phones.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part IV.
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II. Background Law
A. Standards
Patent standards help ensure products are more valuable for
consumers and less costly to produce. 16  These standards are
promulgated by standard-setting organizations ("SSO")."
Technological patents that are necessary to comply with a standard
are known as standard-essential patents ("SEP")." In the
smartphone market, SEPs include wireless broadband
technologies, video compression technologies, and
telecommunication standards.19 Ideally, standards create value for
consumers by "increasing competition, innovation, product
quality, and choice."20 Courts are more likely to grant relief for
patents that are not essential to the implementation of a standard as
it is easier to work around the non-essential patent and still make
and sell a product.2 1 Today, standards have become fundamental
to smart phone telecommunication devices due to their
interoperability. 22
In the telecommunications industry, standards also contain a
beneficial "network effect."23 A single cellular device that is not
16 Joshua Wright, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, SSOs, FRAND, Antitrust:
Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 5 (Sep. 12, 2013), available at
http://ftc.gov/speeches/wright/130912cpip.pdf.
17 See Carrier, supra note 4, at 2. Sometimes SSOs are referred to as Standard
Development Organizations ("SDOs"). See Frequently Asked Questions Regarding
Patent Pools and Standard Setting Organizations, OBLON SPIVAK,
http://www.oblon.com/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-patent-pools-and-standard-
setting-organizations (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). For the purposes of this paper, the two
words are interchangeable.
18 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents 2 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No.
2243026, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=22
43026.
19 See Carrier, supra note 4, at 2.
20 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THIRD PARTY UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION'S STATEMENT ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST 2 (2012) [hereinafter FTC
Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf.
21 See Carrier, supra note 4, at 4.
22 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY
F/RAND.COMMITMENTS 2 (2013) [hereinafter USDOJ & USPTO Policy Statement],
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf.
23 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 42.
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connected to a network has little utility, but if the same device can
connect to millions of other telephones and content providers, it
can become very useful.24 Therefore, "the value of any individual
device is enhanced in proportion to the number of other devices to
which it may connect."25  Standards help to make this network
effect possible across different manufacturers and wireless
networks.26
Typically, for an SSO to agree to license an SEP, the holder
must agree to license his patent on FRAND2 7 terms.28 This
FRAND commitment serves two primary goals: (1) it promotes
the standard by assuring companies implementing the standard that
they will not be blocked from bringing their products to market so
long as they are willing to pay reasonable royalties for any
standard-essential patents; and (2) it provides reasonable rewards
to those who invested in research to help develop the technology
used by the standard. 29 The FRAND commitment also protects
consumers who would otherwise have to bear the cost of a patent
holder negotiating the license of his patent on terms that
potentially could not be fair or reasonable.30
SSOs and their members rely on these voluntary FRAND
commitments to facilitate the bilateral licensing negotiations
necessary for successful widespread adoption of a standard, and to
provide assurances to implementers of the standard that the
patented technologies will be available to parties seeking to license
them." By making a FRAND licensing commitment, patent
holders who focus on licensing their inventions benefit from an
expanded source of revenue, while the patent holders who sell
products and services related to the standard benefit from




27 In some jurisdictions, SSO members may have their members' license on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms ("RAND"). See USDOJ & USPTO Policy
Statement, supra note 22, at n.2. For the purposes of this paper, FRAND and RAND
pledges are interchangeable.
28 FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 2.
29 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 18.
30 USDOJ & USPTO Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 4.
31 Id. at 5.
32 Id.
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by these incentives to contribute their best technology to the
standardization process. 33  A FRAND commitment may also
contribute to increased follow-on innovation by granting new and
established market entrants non-discriminatory access to protected
networks, allowing new generations of network-operable devices
to be produced and introduced into the market.3 4  Due to the
beneficial nature of FRAND pledges, the United States strongly
encourages FRAND use in the standards process, which helps
strengthen the public interest and protect consumers.
B. Patent Holdup
Patent holdup is a process wherein an SEP owner demands
unreasonably high royalty rates and other favorable terms after
adopting the essential standard in question.36 This is of particular
concern when such favorable terms could not have been credibly
demanded beforehand." Standards licensing can enable patent
holdup because it may not be feasible to deviate from a standard
unless all or most other participants in the industry agree to do so
in compatible ways.3 ' Even so, all the participants face substantial
switching costs in abandoning any initial designs and substituting
a different technology. 9 This leaves an entire industry to become
locked into a standard, thereby giving an SEP owner in the
industry the unreasonable ability "to demand and obtain royalty
payments based not on the true market value of its patents, but on
the costs and delays of switching away from the standardized
technology." 40
The problem with patent holdup, and even the threat of patent
holdup, is that it increases costs and uncertainty for other industry




36 FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 2; see also USDOJ & USPTO Policy
Statement, supra note 22, at 4 ("asserting the patent to exclude a competitor from a
market or obtain a higher price for its use than would have been possible before the
standard was set, when alternative technologies could have been chosen").




41 Id. at 3.
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breaking the connection between the value of an invention and its
reward.4 2 The unwarranted higher royalties are then passed onto
consumers in the form of higher prices.4 3 Furthermore, the threat
of holdup may "reduce the value of standard-setting, leading firms
to rely less on the standard setting process and depriving
consumers of the substantial pro-competitive benefits of standard
setting.""
The resulting imbalance between the value of patented
technology and the rewards for innovation may be especially acute
where the exclusion order is based on a patent covering a small
component of a complex and multicomponent product." This is
particularly relevant for smartphone and tablet devices, which are
generally very complex and consist of many standardized and
patented components.46 As such, the presence of patent holdup in
the smartphone market makes the cost to the public particularly
high.47
There is also a phenomenon known as reverse patent holdup,
wherein an implementer utilizes something that is protected as a
FRAND-encumbered SEP without providing compensation, while
simultaneously claiming that the patent owner's offers to license
were not fair or reasonable.4 8 The infringer in this scenario is
essentially enacting a constructive refusal to negotiate with a
FRAND license or pay a FRAND-based royalty fee.49 This leaves
the infringed patent owner to have to protect himself through
costly litigation.o The SEP holder can also be harmed by the
delay between the time of patent infringement and the issuance of
an exclusionary remedy to protect his rights."'
A FRAND commitment serves as evidence that an SEP owner
planned to monetize its property through broad licensing on
42 Id.
43 USDOJ & USPTO Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 4.
44 FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 2.
45 Id.
46 Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 24-25.
47 See id. at 25.
48 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 63.
49 See Executive Veto, supra note 10, at 2.
50 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 63.
51 See id.
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reasonable terms as opposed to licensing through exclusive use.52
As such, FRAND commitments should ideally mitigate the risk of
patent holdup by forcing the SEP patent holder to negotiate on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. However, concern
remains that a patentee may make a FRAND commitment and then
proceed to seek an exclusionary order for infringement of that
FRAND-encumbered SEP to secure royalties that would otherwise
be inconsistent with the FRAND commitment. 54 After all, a
royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusion order
may be weighted heavily in favor of the patentee, and thereby
creates tension with the FRAND commitment.55  The
aforementioned high switching costs, when combined with the
threat of an exclusionary order, could allow a patentee to obtain
unreasonable licensing terms despite his FRAND commitment to
the contrary." The patentee is thus rewarded not because his
invention is valuable, but simply because implementers are locked
in to practicing the standard and are left with no recourse but to
bow down to the unfair negotiating terms (or to commit reverse
patent holdup)." Realizing royalty rates that reflect patent holdup
causes the cost to produce a product to rise." This cost is
subsequently passed down to consumers and undermines the entire
standards setting process."
Entitling FRAND-encumbered SEP holders to automatic
exclusionary relief for infringement creates an imbalance in
negotiating strength between licensors and licensees and can lead
to patent holdup." Conversely, non-exclusionary remedies may
reduce the chance of patent holdup associated with FRAND-
encumbered SEPs, encouraging innovation by increasing certainty
for groups investing in products that comply with standards and
any complementary technologies." Non-exclusionary remedies
52 FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 5.
53 Id. at 3.
54 Id. at 1.
55 Id. at 3.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 3-4.
59 Id.
6o Id. at 3.
61 Id. at 5.
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are thereby more consistent with the proper role of the standards
patent system.62  Such non-exclusionary remedies may also
prevent the price increases associated with patent holdup without
necessarily reducing incentives to innovate. Due to the
particularly heavy cost consumers bear from exclusionary
remedies when there is presence of patent holdup of FRAND-
encumbered SEP patents, many U.S. governmental agencies worry
about how exclusionary remedies in such circumstances impact the
competitive conditions in the United States."
C. Section 337
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. §
1337 or "Section 337") provides relief for unfair practices in
import trade.6 5 The statute specifically prohibits the import of
products that infringe a valid United States patents.6 6 Moreover,
besides protecting patent holders, the statute also protects the
public interest, reading in pertinent part:
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation
under this Section, that there is a violation of this Section, it
shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person
violating the provision of this Section, be excluded from entry
into the United States, unless, after considering the effect of such
exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like
or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United
States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be
excluded from entry.67
It is important to parse out from Section 337 the four specifically
identified public policy factors for consideration when giving
exclusionary remedies. When the USITC decides to issue an
exclusionary order, it must consider how the order would affect:
(1) the public health and welfare; (2) competitive conditions in the
United States economy; (3) the production of like or directly
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 3; USDOJ & USPTO Policy
Statement, supra note 22, at 4.
65 19U.S.C.§ 1337 (2011).
66 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2011).
67 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
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competitive articles in the United States; and (4) the United States
consumers (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "public
policy factors")." The same factors must also be considered when
issuing cease and desist orders under the statute.6" Cease and
desist orders have a similar effect on consumers and the public as
exclusionary orders.'
These public policy factors allow the USITC, if it so chooses,
to take into consideration the presence of patent holdup and any
possible FRAND obligations at play in determining its remedy for
an infringed SEP patent.7' Since patent holdup involving FRAND-
encumbered SEP patents is so detrimental to consumers,7 2 its
presence can drastically affect possible available remedies for the
infringed patent holder." Notably, however, the USITC has been
very reluctant to modify exclusionary orders based on an
examination of the Section 337 public policy factors.7 ' The
Commission has regularly rejected public interest arguments when
it finds either that alternative suppliers cannot provide comparable
products or that the products are not critical to public health and
welfare.7 ' For example, if a patentee can supply all the domestic
demand, the Commission finds no public interest problem, even if
the patentee will only satisfy the demand at a higher price.7 ' As
was the USITC's current trend at the time of this Apple and
Samsung litigation, the Commission has not considered higher
prices (and lower availability) of recreational products to
68 See id.
69 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1); USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 105.
70 Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 4. For the purposes of this paper, cease and
desist orders have no notable difference in effect as exclusionary orders, and all
arguments applied against exclusionary orders apply to cease and desist orders, unless
otherwise noted.
71 Id. at 4.
72 See supra Part I.B. for more information about patent holdup's impact on
consumers.
73 See generally Executive Veto, supra note 10 (explaining the careful eye needed
when there is patent holdup threat for FRAND-encumbered SEPs).
74 Examples of when the factors did affect the USITC's orders include car parts
necessary for improved fuel efficiency, scientific equipment for nuclear physics research,
and hospital bum recovery beds. Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 19-20.
75 Id. at 23.
76 Id.
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consumers to be of notable concern to the public welfare."
III. Procedural History
A. USITC Order
Samsung filed a complaint to the USITC alleging that its
patent numbers 7,706,348 (the "'348 patent"), 7,486,644 (the
'644 patent"), 7,450,114 (the "'114 patent"), and 6,771,980 (the
"980 patent") have been infringed by Apple." Specifically,
Samsung claims that Apple's various iPhones, iPads, iPod Touch
devices violate the aforementioned Samsung patents, and thereby
also violate Section 337.79 For the purposes of this Note, only the
'348 patent is at issue, as the other three patents were ultimately
found to have not been infringed upon.o
Samsung's '348 patent is considered essential under the
Universal Mobile Telecommunications Standard ("UMTS"),
which is a technical standard issued by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI"), an SSO
headquartered in France." Both Apple and Samsung are members
of the ETSI.82 The ETSI is one of six SSOs that combine to form
what is known as the Third Generation Platform Partnership
("3GPP"), which sets the standard for mobile wireless carrier
technologies, including the UMTS standard. 3 Since Samsung's
'348 patent is declared essential under the UMTS standard, it is
considered an SEP, and is also licensed under FRAND terms.
The '348 patent is titled as the "Apparatus and Method for
Encoding/Decoding Transport Format Indicator in CDMA Mobile
Communication System."" The patent, summarized in the most
basic way, concerns the way a device connects wirelessly to a
network. The apparatus in question encodes and decodes
77 Id.
78 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 1.
79 Id.
8o Id. at 3.
81 Id. at 1.
82 Id. at 42.
83 Id. at 42-43.
84 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 2.
85 Id. at 6.
86 See id-
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transport format combination indicator protocol signals ("TFCI
signals") within a cellular network." The TFCI signals encode a
receiver of a transmitted data rate into longer codewords to help
ensure the information is received correctly.88 With respect to the
'348 patent, Samsung accused the AT&T models of Apple's
iPhone 4; iPhone 3GS; iPhone 3; iPad 3G; and iPad 2 3G
(collectively the "accused '348 products") of infringement of this
apparatus.8 9
Earlier in the dispute, the presiding administrative law judge
issued an initial determination finding ("ID") that Samsung's '348
patent was valid, but that Apple was not infringing upon it.90
Samsung, Apple, and the Commission investigative attorney all
filed petitions for review of the final ID to the USITC. 91 The
USITC reversed the ID in part and found that Apple's accused
'348 products infringed upon Samsung's '348 patent because the
Intel baseband processor in the accused devices contained identical
relevant source code.9 2 Specifically, the Apple devices
implemented the same TFCI encoding scheme as the '348 patent.
After rejecting Apple's various affirmative defenses,9 4 the USITC
remedied Samsung's harm by issuing an import ban exclusionary
order, along with a cease-and-desist order against the infringing
Apple products.95 The Commission explicitly refused to delay the
effective date of its exclusionary order,96 but Apple was permitted
to import its devices during the Executive sixty-day review period
with a bond set at 0% because Samsung was unable to show that
its products needed protection.97
The USITC undertook an examination of the public policy
factors as required by Section 337.9' The Commission concluded
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 21.
90 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 1.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 3.
93 Id. at 21-23.
94 See id. at 41-66.
9s Id. at 3-4.
96 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 115-17.
97 Id. at 118-19.
98 Id. at 107.
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that excluding the pertinent Apple iPhones and iPads would not
have an "adverse effect" on the "public health and welfare."9 9 Nor
did the Commission believe that the exclusionary orders would
adversely affect the "production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States," as none of the competitive articles in
question (i.e., smartphones and tablets) are actually produced in
the United States.'" The Commission further believed that the
exclusionary order's effect on "competitive conditions in the
United States economy" and on "U.S. consumers" would have a
small overall impact.'"' Also factoring into the decision was the
notion that a wide variety of other smartphone and tablet devices
from Apple would still be available to the public.'02 Simply put,
the Commission did not view the exclusionary order's effect on
the public interest as a whole to be adverse enough as to warrant
denying exclusionary relief for Samsung.'o
B. Executive Veto
On August 3, 2013, President Obama's Executive
Administration issued a veto over the USITC's order.'" Section
337 requires the President to engage in a policy evaluation of any
exclusionary or cease and desist order issued by the USITC.'os
The President is also given the power to veto a USITC
exclusionary order on policy grounds.'06  This authority of the
President has been delegated to the United States Trade
Representative.'0o The Executive Administration grounded the
veto within an analysis of the Section 337 policy factors.'0o
The Executive Administration's explanation of the veto, issued
in memorandum, gives explicit reference and support to a "Policy
Statement," issued by the United States Department of Justice
99 Id. at 109.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 110.
103 Id. at 111.
104 See Executive Veto, supra note 10.
los Id. at 1.
106 Id. An exclusionary order does go into effect during this sixty-day period unless
the respondents post a bond. Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 31-32.
107 Executive Veto, supra note 10, at 1.
1o8 See id.
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("DOJ"), Antitrust Division, and U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO"), concerning SEPs subject to FRAND
commitments.109 The policy statement gives extra weight to the
Section 337 public policy analysis whenever a possible issue of
patent holdup is present."o The statement further indicates that the
public policy factors listed in Section 337 should be given
"overriding consideration[]" when determining the proper remedy
for an infringed SEP burdened with a FRAND obligation."'
Finally, the statement reiterates that a patent owner making a
voluntary FRAND commitment may affect whether an
exclusionary order is the appropriate remedy for an
infringement.112
The Executive Administration further explained that
remedying a FRAND-encumbered SEP, because of the possible
presence of patent holdup, is not as straight forward as remedying
a non-standards essential patent."' While acknowledging the
desire to promote innovation and economic progress, which
includes providing adequate remedies and protection of
intellectual property rights, the Executive Administration
continuously stressed the importance of a thorough review of the
public policy considerations when dealing with SEPs licensed on
FRAND terms, mainly due to concern about patent holdup and its
detrimental nature toward the public at large."4  Without
reviewing the actual legal analysis and findings of the USITC, the
Executive Administration decided to veto the USITC exclusionary
remedy based solely on this public policy consideration, worrying
about the effect this exclusionary order would have on competitive
conditions in the U.S. economy, along with its effect toward U.S.
consumers.'
The Executive Administration was clear that it is not claiming
109 Id. at 1-2.
1 lo See USDOJ & USPTO Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 8-9.
mI Id. at 10.
112 Id. at 6.
113 See generally Executive Veto, supra note 10 (underscoring the need for a
thorough examination of FRAND-encumbered SEPs).
114 Id. at 2-3.
tus Id. at 3. The Administration does not mention whether any specific facts of the
case at issue (such as the nature of the products being excluded) impacted its public
policy analysis in any way, preferring to present a more holistic approach.
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that a patent encumbered with a FRAND commitment is a
universal per se bar that precludes an exclusionary order
remedy.1 6 In fact, the Executive Administration noted there are
situations where an exclusionary remedy of a FRAND-
encumbered SEP would still be applicable, but simply does not
think that is the case here."7 Furthermore, the prevention of an
exclusionary remedy is not to say that a FRAND-encumbered
patent holder is prevented from recovering its injury in another
form."' The patent holder is still entitled to receive "appropriate
compensation that reflects the value of the technology contributed
to the standard,"" 9 although the Executive Administration does not
postulate what that would amount to in this case.'2 0
Finally, the Executive Administration laid out guidelines for
the Commission to follow to avoid a future veto.' 2 ' These
guidelines stipulated that the USITC should: (1) examine carefully
the public policy factors listed in Section 337 when determining a
particular remedy; and (2) develop factual records concerning the
standard-essential nature of a patent at issue and the possible
presence of patent holdup or reverse holdup, and to make explicit
findings on the issue. 2 2  In the future, the Executive
Administration will expect the USITC to undertake a close policy
review in any decisions involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs,
looking for the possible presence of patent holdup and toward the
standards-essential nature of the patent at issue in order to make a
determination if an exclusionary remedy would be in the public
interest.123
116 USDOJ & USPTO Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 7.
117 Executive Veto, supra note 10, at n.3. One instance calling for an exclusionary
remedy would be a FRAND-encumbered SEP whose "putative licensee is unable or
refuses to take a F/RAND license and is acting outside the scope of the patent holder's
commitment to license on F/RAND terms." Id.
118 See id.
i19 USDOJ & USPTO Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 8.
120 See Executive Veto, supra note 10.
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IV. Analysis
A. Support for the Executive Veto
Many governmental agencies have issued policy statements
regarding patent holdup and its relationship with the Section 337
public policy factors.'24 As mentioned earlier, the USDOJ and the
USPTO have supported a broad reading of the public policy
factors whenever voluntary FRAND commitments are involved.125
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has also weighed in on
the matter, noting that, in cases that address FRAND-encumbered
SEPs, the FTC urges the USITC to follow the requirements of
Section 337's public policy factors and to specifically consider the
impact of patent holdup on competitive conditions and United
States consumers.'26 The FTC statement postulated that "ITC
issuance of an exclusion or cease and desist order in matters
involving [F]RAND-encumbered SEPs, where infringement is
based on implementation of standardized technology, has the
potential to cause substantial harm to U.S. competition, consumers
and innovation."' 27 Furthermore, a bipartisan group of Senators
hinted that a veto of the USITC order would be justified.'28
Referring to the issued order, the group noted:
[a]ny precedent that would enable or encourage companies to
include their patented technology in a standard, commit to
license included patents on FRAND terms, and then seek or
threaten to seek to secure an exclusion order against a willing
licensee despite a breach of that commitment would thus
implicate significant policy concerns. Such an outcome could
undermine broad participation in the standards-setting process
and in turn threaten the meaningful benefits these standards
provide for competition and consumers. 129
While the Senators did not take a position on the merits of the case
124 See, e.g., Executive Veto, supra note 10; FTC Statement, supra note 20.
125 USDOJ & USPTO Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 9-10.
126 FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 1-2.
127 Id. at 1.
128 See Letter from U.S. Sens. Amy Klobuchar, Mike Lee, Barbara Boxer & James
Risch to Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the Pres. (July 30,
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at hand, they urged the Executive Administration to give serious
consideration to public policy factors when deciding whether to
veto a USITC order.130 The Senators expressed concern that
companies would be less likely to participate in standards if they
could not count on fair dealings with companies who have
FRAND commitments.13 '
Also weighing in favor of the Executive Veto is the fact that
patent holdup remains a particular concern whenever the patent is
a small component part of larger complex products, as is the case
for patent '348.132 For example, a patent on a particular circuit
layout may constitute only a tiny fraction of the value of a
microprocessor that uses the layout, but an exclusion order would
exclude the microprocessor as a whole, not only preventing
importation of the small infringing element, but also importation
of the larger and non-infringing elements.' This phenomenon
creates disproportionate social harm, another reason to consider
applying the public interest exception.'34 Something similar is
happening in this case, where patent '348's baseband processor
code is but a small component of smartphone devices.' The
exclusion order affects more than just the supply of the processor
(i.e., the infringing feature); it affects the price and supply of all
components in smartphone devices, and the devices as a whole
(i.e., the non-infringing features and functionalities).'" An
exclusionary order in this case also affects the customers and third
parties who rely on these non-infringing features, along with the
companies whose research and development go into the non-
infringing components.' The situation patent holdup creates for
small components of larger complex devices just what Section
337's public policy factors are aimed at preventing: cost and harm
to consumers. 3 8
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 24-25 (discussing the dynamics of patent
holdup).
133 Id. at 25.
134 Id.
135 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at D5.
136 Id. at 27.
137 Id.
138 See Executive Veto, supra note 10, at 2-3.
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Whether Samsung actually violated its FRAND obligations is
in dispute.' Samsung maintains it made multiple good faith
offers to Apple.140 Samsung's offer to Apple consisted of 2.4
percent of the chip price royalty rate, 4 ' or required a non-SEP
Apple license in return for license of Samsung's '348 patent.1 42
Apple contended that an offer of 2.4 percent royalty does not
satisfy a FRAND obligation, is exploitative, and was being used to
exclude Apple products from the market.143 For standard-essential
patents, a reasonable royalty should be based on a "hypothetical
arms-length negotiation" that takes place at the time the SSO is
selecting the standard.144 One Dutch court found the 2.4 percent
royalty offer so unreasonable, "so far out of the FRAND ballpark,"
that it concluded Samsung must have violated its FRAND
obligation.'4 5 The European Commission also issued a Statement
of Objections asserting that Samsung, in negotiating with Apple,
abused its position beyond what its FRAND obligation allows.146
In a letter to Samsung, Apple claimed, "Samsung's demand would
imply approximately a 44 percent aggregate royalty burden on
UMTS products. This is far above the 5-7 percent range that
Samsung argued (in its earlier litigation with Ericsson and
InterDigital) was the appropriate range for aggregate royalties." 4 7
139 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 53-64.
140 See id. at A24.
141 Id. at 55.
142 Id. at D3.
143 See id. at A25; see also Florian Mueller, Apple Seeks $2.5 Billion in Damages
from Samsung, Offers Half A Cent Per Standard-Essential Patent, FOSSPATENTS (July
24, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/07/apple-seeks-25-billion-in-damages-
from.html (discussing Apple's comparison of Samsung's offer to its own estimated
values).
144 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1147.
145 Florian Mueller, Samsung Loses Dutch Case Against Apple Over 3G Patents As
Court Gives Meaning to FRAND, FOSSPATENTS (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.fosspatents
.com/201 1/1 0/samsung-loses-dutch-case-against-apple.html.
146 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents, EUROPA
(Dec. 21, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP- 12-1448_en.htm.
147 Letter from Boris Teksler, Director of Patent Licensing & Strategy, Apple, to
Seongwoo Kim, Director, Samsung Electronics 2 (April 30, 2012), filed as Decl. John
M. Pierce, Ex. 18, Apple, Inc., v. Samsung Electronics Co., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (No. 5:1 1-CV-01846), ECF No. 2038-19, aff'd in part, vacated in part, 735
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/108832665/12-04-
30-apple-samsung-teksler-kim-letter-re-frand.
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Samsung probably put the royalty price so high in order to gain
bargaining leverage to extract some sort of cross-license
agreement from Apple.'4 8 This negotiating tactic is questionable
when one has promised to offer a license on fair and reasonable
terms.'49 Finally, Commissioner Pinkert, in his dissent from the
USITC order, noted his belief that Samsung's offer to Apple did
not "satisfy an objective standard of reasonableness . . . .""'
Commissioner Pinkert also read the public interest factors
more broadly than his peers."s' He grounded this view in the
legislative history of Section 337, which, he argues, indicates the
factors are an overriding consideration, and that "any evidence" of
exploitative monopolistic practices (i.e., patent holdup) is a proper
basis for denying exclusion.'5 2 By refusing to make a FRAND
patent available on reasonable terms, especially for a patent
covering a minor element of a complex product, the patent holder
is harming the public welfare, in Pinkert's view.'5 3  Disagreeing
with the majority, Pinkert believes eliminating the iPhone 4 and
iPad 2 competition denies the public not only those devices
themselves, but also access to a large and diverse library of
software applications unique to Apple and its devices.'5 4 The
iPhone is highly interoperable with other Apple devices, and the
exclusionary order would completely eliminate this benefit to the
U.S. economy, even though the order ostensibly covers only a
small component of the product.' Pinkert would therefore deny
an exclusionary order in this specific case after considering
Section 337's public policy factors and his belief that Samsung
breached its FRAND obligations and caused patent holdup.'
I48 See id.
149 See id.; see also Florian Mueller, Apple Filing Reveals Samsung Recently
Reduced its 2.4% Royalty Demand for Standard-Essential Patents, FossPATENTs (April
5, 2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/apple-filing-reveals-samsung-recently.
html (discussing Samsung's negotiating tactics).
150 USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at D3.
151 See id. at D4.
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 Id. at D7.
'55 See id. at D6-D7.
156 See USITC OPINION, supra note 8. Note, however, that Pinkert does not suggest
an alternative remedy for Samsung. Presumably it would be monetary in nature,
although how much he does not speculate. Alterative remedies for infringed patents
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Apple argued in the proceedings that the existence of a
FRAND obligation precludes an exclusionary order except in
extraordinary circumstances."' Once again, patent holdup is
presented as the ultimate fear, a "dead-weight" economic loss that
cuts companies' investment in research, design, and supply of
products, inhibits competition in the United States, and drives up
the prices of wireless-communication devices.' Apple is not
alone in this position.'59 Other entities who expressed formal
concern over exclusionary orders for SEP holders with FRAND
obligations include: the Association for Completive Technologies;
the Business Software Alliance; Ericcson, Inc.; Hewlett-Packard;
and Intel Corporation.'16  Naturally, these groups' self-interests
may influence their views on the matter.
Finally, it is worth mentioning again that none of the preceding
rationales proclaim a universal per se bar from issuing
exclusionary orders against a FRAND-encumbered SEP that
would set bad precedent.16' Rather, it is a relatively ad hoc
approach wherein the public interest factors are weighed against
the need for the exclusionary remedy.'62 In this case, the perceived
public harm from the USITC's exclusionary order is an overriding
concern that outweighs its benefit for Samsung.'63
B. Opposition to the Executive Veto
Despite the presence of a FRAND-encumbered SEP patent, it
is debatable whether there actually was patent holdup in this
case.'" The USITC majority, for example, held that Apple never
actually proved violation of any FRAND obligation 65  or
besides exclusionary orders are discussed later in this paper, infra, Section 111(c).
157 See id. at A3.
158 Id.
Is See, e.g., id. at A4-A9.
i6o Id. at A4-A9.
161 See Executive veto, supra note 10, at n.3 (citing U.S. Dep't. of Justice & U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standard-Essential




164 See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at 66 ("[Tlhe record evidence shows that
'hold-up' concern is not present here.").
165 Id. at 113.
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negotiated in bad faith, 6 6 and instead declared that Samsung had
widely licensed the '348 patent.167 The USITC went even further
to suggest that Apple may be committing reverse patent holdup by
refusing to pay FRAND royalties until after the litigation is settled,
by delaying the patent holder (Samsung) from an exclusionary
remedy of its infringed patent, and by leaving expensive litigation
as Samsung's only option for protecting its intellectual-property
rights.'6 1 While the legal findings of the USITC control the matter
at hand, other groups, such as the European Commission, have
expressed official condemnation toward Samsung for abusing its
position as an SEP holder.' The actual truth of the matter
remains debatable.17 0
The South Korean government has raised concern over the
veto (Samsung is headquartered in Seoul, South Korea).' 7 ' To put
the concern in context, the USITC import ban order was
Samsung's most significant win in its on-going litigation with
Apple, and Samsung's only significant win in the United States
judicial system.172  Despite finally getting a notable legal victory,
the United States government stepped in and essentially took the
victory away from Samsung, a South Korean-based company, and
gave it to Apple, a United States-based company. However, the
Executive Veto was not issued in a vacuum, and there is
substantial support for the rationale behind the veto regardless of
166 Id. at 59.
167 Id. at 113.
168 Id. at 63.
169 See e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of
Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse ofMobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents,
EUROPA (Dec. 21, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-1448_en.htm.
170 The Executive Administration chose to remain silent as to any legal findings
concerning Samsung's negotiating tactics, although its policy review of patent holdup
suggests that the Executive Administration found it to at least be somewhat relevant for
the matter at hand, which implicates Samsung.
171 South Korea Says Concerned About U.S. Decision on Some Apple Models,
REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013 2:07 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-
samsung-apple-idUSBRE97405C20130805; Brid-Aine Parnell, South Korea: We're
'Concerned' that Obama Saved Apple from Ban, THE REGISTER (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/08/05/skgov-annoyed-by-obama-ban-decision.
172 See generally Florian Mueller, Apple Isn't Winning the Patent Spat with
Samsung Any More Than There Were Americans in Baghdad, FOSSPATENTS (Aug. 12,
2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/08/apple-isnt-winning-patent-spat-
with.html (comparing Samsung's global litigation versus Apple's).
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the location of the parties. 7 1 Consequently, the implicit
allegations of home-cooking in favor of Apple are merely
circumstantial.
Some technology groups 7 4 disagree with Apple's desire to
mostly exclude exclusionary remedies for FRAND-encumbered
SEPs, and advocate instead for relatively broad access to
injunctive relief over SEPs.'17  For example, the Innovation
Alliance stated that "[i]t is hard to see how [a decision denying
exclusionary remedies] will do anything but lead to less
participation in standard setting bodies and more litigation
involving not just standard essential patents, but also declared-
standard essential patents. That is bad for innovation and bad for
U.S. consumers." 76  Just as with Apple, and the groups that
support Apple's position, companies have their own self-interests
to protect, which may prejudice their proffered views on the
matter.
Lastly, as an administrative agency, the USITC is not even
capable of issuing a remedy other than an injunction or
exclusionary orders. 77  While an award of monetary damages
would be of greater benefit to public consumers while still
providing a remedy for Samsung's wrong, the USITC lacks the
power to do so even if it wanted.'17  However, there are some
creative solutions the USITC could utilize, such as delaying the
effect of the exclusionary order for a set period of time.' The
Commission could also set a tailored bond, which has very similar
effects as a monetary remedy since the infringer would not
ultimately be completely barred from importing the infringing
devices while the infringed patent holder would receive monetary
173 See FTC Statement, supra note 20 (declaring a policy of carefully examining the
Section 337 factors when there is possible patent holdup of FRAND-encumbered patents,
issued a year earlier than the Executive veto).
174 Such as GTW Associates; Innovation Alliance; Motorola Mobility, LLC;
Qualcomm Inc.; and of course Samsung. See USITC Opinion, supra note 8, at AI-A13.
175 Florian Mueller, Yes We FRAND: Various Pending ITC Complaints over
Standard-Essential Patents May Be Withdrawn, FOSSPATENTS (Aug. 4, 2013, 8:05 AM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/08/yes-we-frand-various-pending-itc.html.
176 Id.
177 See Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 28 (stating that the ITC cannot award
damages; it can only exclude products).
178 Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 28.
179 See FTC Statement, supra note 20, at 4.
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compensation in some form.s 0 This leaves the public free to
benefit from the market competition.'"' A patentee is also always
free to file a claim in a district court wherein he may be able to get
damages awarded, unlike in a USITC investigation.18 2
C. Forward-looking ramifications
The Executive Veto's underlying rationale provides
precedential value for the USITC to follow.' The veto specified
guidelines for the USITC to follow, which will cause the USITC
to seek to protect the public interest where there is threat of patent
holdup.' Going forward, the USITC is likely to be at least
somewhat less willing to grant exclusionary orders than before.'
As a result, it is possible some litigants will choose to litigate in
district courts, rather than bring an action under the USITC, in
order to avoid the "ever-increasing bar" it will now take to get an
USITC exclusionary order for any FRAND-encumbered patent.' 6
Currently, the United States government has set up a U.S.
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator to start an
interagency review of existing procedures that the USITC uses in
order "to evaluate the scope of exclusion orders, and to ensure the
process and standards utilized during exclusion order enforcement
activities are transparent, effective, and efficient."'
As to Apple and Samsung's current litigation troubles, the
Executive Veto certainly gives Apple leverage over Samsung in its
180 Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that the ITC can use its statutory
authority to set a bond to permit continued importation during the review period but
condition that importation on the payment of money).
181 See Chien & Lemley, supra note 3, at 32 (arguing that small tweaks to those
aspects of how the ITC awards injunctions can potentially yield big benefits to the public
interest).
182 Id. at 28.
183 See Executive Veto, supra note 10, at 3.
184 Id.
185 See What Does the U.S. Trade Representative's Disapproval of the Samsung-
Apple Exclusion Order Mean for SEP Cases at the ITC?, ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Aug.
6, 2013), http://essentialpatentblog.com/2013/08/what-does-the-u-s-trade-representativ
es-disapproval-of-the-samsung-apple-exclusion-order-mean-for-sep-cases-at-the-itc
(projecting an increasing bar to be able to get ITC exclusion orders).
186 Id.
187 Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, THE WHITE
HOUSE (June 04, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-
sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
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other disputes currently under litigation, including any further
negotiations for patent royalties with any other Samsung FRAND-
encumbered SEPs.'" Conversely, Samsung is now handicapped in
being able to pursue higher licensing fees from Apple in any future
negotiations the two companies may engage in, as well as with
other companies in its FRAND-encumbered SEPs.189 Samsung
now needs to decide how it wishes to pursue a remedy of monetary
compensation from Apple, and whether or not it wishes to file suit
in district court.' 90 A district court ruling of course cannot be
vetoed by the Executive Administration, and is not bound by any
USITC ruling."' While Samsung is currently hurt by the
Executive Veto, as indicated by a decline in Samsung's market
value after the veto was issued,19 2 this decision should ultimately
benefit Samsung when it is on the other side of the matter and
acting as a licensee instead of a licensor.' 93
It is hard to say what impact the Executive Veto will have on
future FRAND negotiations. The Executive Veto certainly
reduced the leverage of any holder of FRAND-encumbered SEPs,
whether Samsung, Apple, or another company, in future
negotiations.19 Companies that hold a large amount of patents,
and receive a large amount of royalties for such patents, may
become limited in their revenue raising abilities (outside of
developing new patents, which can be costly).'95 Ultimately, this
188 Mueller, supra note 175.
189 Susan Decker, Dawn Kopecki & Pui-Wing Tam, IPhone Reprieve Seen Aiding
Apple Sales, Hurting Samsung, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2013 4:04 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-04/iphone-reprieve-seen-aiding-apple-sales-
hurting-samsung.html.
190 See Mueller, supra note 175.
191 Id. (stating that Samsung can't appeal the Presidential veto, but could appeal the
part of the ITC ruling that threw out its non-SEP claims).
192 Yoni Heisler, Samsung's Market Value Plummets Following US Presidential
Veto, TUAW (Aug. 5, 2013 1:30 PM), http://www.tuaw.com/2013/08/05/samsung-
market-value-plummets-following-us-presidential-veto.
193 See Mueller, supra note 175.
194 Id. (stating that after the presidential veto it is still not impossible that someone
might win a U.S. import ban over FRAND-pledged SEPs at some point, but only under
rare and narrow circumstances).
195 Decker et al., supra note 189 (arguing that the decision by U.S. Trade
Representative Michael Froman could limit the ability of large patent-holding companies
like Qualcomm Inc., InterDigital Inc. and Dolby Laboratories Inc. to rely on royalty
revenue from standards patents used in smartphone chips or sound transmission),
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may be for the best since the goal of the public policy factors is not
to provide undue leverage for licensors, but rather to protect
American consumers from any such undue leverage.'9 6
South Korea's courts have already decided cases in a way that
has caused some to suggest the country may be becoming a "rogue
state" in FRAND rights.19 7 While Samsung has struggled to have
success in its patent litigation in other countries, it has had success
on their home turf in South Korea.' For example, earlier in 2012,
the South Korean government banned some Apple devices for
infringing Samsung SEPs.'99 This ban gives Samsung remarkable
negotiating leverage with its SEPs (and thereby effectuates patent
holdup), as Apple is forced to decide between writing off the
Korean market, bowing to Samsung's negotiating demands, 200 and
seeking to resolve the matter through bilateral talks between the
two countries' political systems.2 0' It is possible, especially given
the South Korean government's expressed concern over the
Executive Veto, the country will continue to go down a strict path
concerning FRAND and SEP rights. However, not everyone is
concerned about South Korea's patent laws, noting that the South
Korean court's decision was well-reasoned and that evidence of
the South Korean courts construing FRAND rights unfairly in
order to give a home field advantage to Samsung is lacking.202
As for the other ongoing disputes in the "smartphone patent
wars," other technological companies may decide to withdraw
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-04/iphone-reprieve-seen-aiding-apple-sales-
hurting-samsung.html.
196 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2011); S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 199
(1974).
197 Florian Mueller, Apple-Samsung Ruling Suggests South Korea is a FRAND
Rogue State, FosSPATENTS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/08/apple-
samsung-ruling-suggests-south.html.
198 See id. (Apple was found to infringe on two Samsung wireless patents - which
have previously been identified as standard-essential ones).
199 Id.
200 This could include giving up some of the companies' non-standard-essential
property, or paying exorbitant royalty rates.
201 Mueller, supra note 197 (arguing that Apple should defend itself vigorously and,
if necessary, write off the Korean market until the issue is resolved through bilateral
U.S.-Korea talks or at the level of the World Trade Organization).
202 Mark Summerfield, South Korea is Not a 'FRAND Rogue State', PATENTOLOGY
(Nov. 06, 2012 2:15 PM), http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/1l /south-korea-is-not-
frand-rogue-state.html.
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their complaints to the USITC for any SEPs the company may
hold.20 3  Some believe the judicial courts are the appropriate
venues for these disputes anyway, and view such an outcome as a
positive development.20 4 Wells Fargo financial analyst Maynard
Um has suggested that "[w]hile [the Executive Veto] does not
devalue patents and patents will still be necessary as a form of
offense and defense (particularly [SEPs]), companies may think
twice about acquiring portfolios at any cost, given the potentially
reduced chance of being awarded a cease and desist order."20 5
How the Executive Veto may affect future patent litigation
strategy is currently murky, but going forward it certainly will give
licensees a negotiating advantage over licensors.2 06  The full
ramifications of the Executive Veto may not manifest themselves
for years to come.
V. Conclusion
The Executive Veto presents a "victory for consumers and fair
competition."2 07 The USITC order severely underestimated the
vastness and pervasiveness of the smartphone market in the U.S.
economy. Denying an entire generation of smartphones and
tablets solely due to an infringement of a smaller component has
astronomical repercussions for the public. When a FRAND-
encumbered SEP is involved, exclusionary remedies that would
remove products from the market will always impose high costs on
consumers, but would have been especially acute here. Certainly,
Samsung is entitled to a remedy for its infringed patent, but the
USITC exclusionary order was not the right remedy in this case as
it would essentially force the public to have to bear the cost of
Apple's wrongdoing. While the public interest happens to
coincide with Apple's interests this time, it is eminently possible
203 Mueller, supra note 175 (arguing that Ericsson, Samsung, and/or InterDigital
may withdraw their ITC complaints).
204 Decker et al., supra note 189.
205 Neil Hughes, Presidential Veto in Favor of Apple Expected to Alter Future
Patent Litigation Strategies, APPLEINSIDER (Aug. 5, 2013), http://appleinsider
.com/articles/i 3/08/05/presidential-veto-in-favor-of-apple-expected-to-alter-future-
patent-litigation-strategies.
206 See id. (stating that "Samsung will likely have less leverage to negotiate the
compensation rates it originally wanted," and that "the [executive] veto could also reduce
the perceived value of some patents").
207 See Mueller, supra note 12.
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the public interest could rest with any number of the technological
giants, including Samsung, in a future dispute. After all, the
continuous smartphone patent litigation concerns more than just
the profits of the companies involved; these legal disputes
reverberate throughout the world's economy, for better or for
worse.
The smartphone patent wars form a web of disputes across the
entire globe. While the public at large would benefit if the
onslaught of litigation were to subside, the smartphone patent wars
appear unlikely to be something that is going to end, or even slow
down, anytime soon.208 Until then, while the technology giants
trade their money around from various legal victories to legal
defeats, it is the public consumers who truly bear the risk of
substantial harm from these disputes.
208 See Carrier, supra note 4, at 7.
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